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ABSTRACT 
Hardware virtualization technologies play a significant role in cyber security. On the one hand these 
technologies enhance security levels, by designing a trusted operating system. On the other hand these 
technologies can be taken up into modern malware which is rather hard to detect. None of the existing 
methods is able to efficiently detect a hypervisor in the face of countermeasures such as time cheating, 
temporary self-uninstalling, memory hiding etc. New hypervisor detection methods which will be described 
in this paper can detect a hypervisor under these countermeasures and even count several nested ones. 
These novel approaches rely on the new statistical analysis of time discrepancies by examination of a set of 
instructions, which are unconditionally intercepted by a hypervisor. Reliability was achieved through the 
comprehensive analysis of the collected data despite its fluctuation. These offered methods were 
comprehensively assessed in both Intel and AMD CPUs. 
Keywords: hypervisor threat, rootkit hypervisor, nested hypervisors, instruction execution time, statistics 
and data analysis, Blue Pill. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays successful malware detection is 
becoming increasingly important, because malware 
cyber-attacks can result in financial, reputational, 
process and other losses. We can overcome these 
risks only through anticipatory development of 
advanced cyber security solutions. 
Intel and AMD have released more advanced CPUs 
with hardware virtualization support, which runs 
code directly on top of the physical hardware. This 
privileged code is named Virtual Machine Monitor 
(VMM), bare-metal hypervisor or just 
“hypervisor”. A hypervisor with a secure system 
monitor functions allows us to run multiple OSes  
at the same time in one PC, (see Figure 1). As a 
result this architecture maximizes the hardware 
utilization and reduces the costs of operation. This 
is an obvious advantage of hardware virtualization 
based hypervisors (Derock, 2009; Barrett, & 
Kipper, 2010). At present more than a billion 
processors with this technology are installed in 
workstations as well as in cloud computing servers 
on the Internet. 
However, at the same time hardware virtualization 
technology increases vulnerability of systems, 
seeing that rootkit hypervisor with backdoor 
functionality can be planted in the PC (Ben-
Yehuda, 2013). This type of rootkits is also knows 
as Hardware-based Virtual Machine Rootkit (HVM 
rootkit). 
The cyber security community faces the challenge  
of hypervisor detection. Presently there is no 
built-in tool to detect a hypervisor reliably. Of 
course we can check basic things: CR4.VMXE bit 
in Intel case (Intel, 2014) or EFER.SVME bit in 
AMD case (AMD, 2013), but a hypervisor can hide 
its original value. Moreover, it is impossible to 
block, stop or unload a hypervisor by using existing 
known cyber security tools, resides on virtualized 
OS level. 
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Figure 1 PC without Hypervisor and under Control of the Two Nested Hypervisors:  
a Legitimate one and Rootkit 
 
The difficulties of this challenge arise from the 
following causes. Firstly hypervisors can use a 
wide variety of different techniques to prevent 
detection. Secondly, it is possible to run several 
nested hypervisors. Thirdly, a hypervisor can be 
installed via a driver or boot records as well as 
via BIOS (Kovah, Kallenberg, Butterworth, & 
Cornwell, 2014) or UEFI (Bulygin, Loucaides, 
Furtak, Bazhaniuk, & Matrosov, 2014), which 
makes the deleting of a hypervisor rather 
difficult.  
Utin (2014) analyzed the possibility of 
BIOS-based hypervisor threat. The author’s ideas 
are based on the suspicious hypervisor (Russian 
Ghost) whose detection is simple, because it does 
not apply any countermeasures. 
Despite the fact that hardware virtualization is not 
new and involves a world-wide community of 
researchers, the development of effective 
hypervisor detection methods has so far been 
without success. 
The goal of this paper is to tackle this issue. This 
article presents new detection methods which are 
based on the difference between the instruction 
execution time (IET) both, with a hypervisor and 
without it. We applied a set of specific 
instructions which cause VM-exits 
unconditionally or are trapped by a hypervisor. 
As a result, IET takes significantly more time 
with a hypervisor than without any hypervisor. 
This time discrepancy is commonly used to detect 
hypervisors. However, detection by time is 
possible only if a hypervisor is not hiding itself 
via timestamp cheating (Fritsch, 2008; Garfinkel, 
Adams, Warfield, & Franklin, 2007) or via a 
temporary self-uninstalling hypervisor – the 
Blue Chicken technique (Rutkowska, & 
Tereshkin, 2007). Under these conditions the 
hypervisor detection methods based on time 
discrepancies will not work. Therefore, a totally 
new hypervisor detection approach, which is 
resilient to countermeasures, is needed. 
In a nutshell the proposed methods consider  
the IET as a random variable, whose properties 
depend on hypervisor presence. That is why by 
applying probabilistic and statistical methods to 
IET, it may be possible to detect a hypervisor. 
Our detection methods have improved on the 
current time-based detection method, which uses 
unconditionally intercepted instructions. Unlike 
the original method our approach is able to detect 
any stealthy hypervisor, which has applied 
countermeasures: time-cheating, temporary 
self-uninstalling etc. This is a distinct advantage 
of these new methods. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 is devoted to the analysis of 
the most popular software and hardware 
hypervisor detection approaches. The analysis 
will be given in the case of a hypervisor using 
Virtual 
machine 2
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machine 1
Install 
hypervisors
Hypervisor with secure 
system monitor functions
Rootkit 
hypervisor
OS 2
Hardware
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countermeasures to prevent its detection, such as 
time cheating, temporary self-uninstalling, 
preventing memory dump acquisition etc. 
Section 3 contains the processor behavior 
analysis in the three cases without a hypervisor, 
with one and several nested hypervisors. Analysis 
has discovered new useful statistics for the IET, 
which can reveal hypervisors. 
In section 4 the experimental results of statistics 
examination are presented. The positive results of 
these checks make it possible to analyze IET as a 
random variable. As a result this allows us to use 
threshold values of statistics to detect each 
hypervisor. This approach works well under the 
countermeasures and fluctuations of measured 
time durations. The present author’s threshold 
generated methods and hypervisor detection 
approaches and their analysis are briefly 
presented. 
Section 5 contains the main conclusions and 
further research directions. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Nowadays there is no hypervisor detection 
build-in tool for Intel. The built-in tool for AMD 
CPU is vulnerable to hypervisor 
countermeasures. Therefore researchers are 
working hard to solve this challenge. This paper 
gives a classification and analysis of all publicly 
available hypervisor detection methods and 
approaches. 
The history of hypervisor detection started in 
2007 after the first hypervisor rootkit “Blue Pill” 
was presented by Rutkowska (2006). “Blue Pill” 
is a Windows based driver for AMD CPU. At the 
same time Dai Zovi (2006) released “Vitriol” –  
a similar hypervisor for MAC OS and Intel CPU. 
The comparative analysis of these two 
hypervisors was presented by Fannon (2014). 
“Blue Pill” and “Vitriol” became high-profile 
tools in information security sphere and 
motivated the creation a lot of different 
approaches to hypervisor detection. Their 
classification is given in Figure 2. We can 
classify these into four categories: 
signature-based, behavior-based, detection based 
on the trusted hypervisor and approaches which 
use time analysis. Signature-based detection uses 
memory scanning of hypervisors’ patterns. The 
latter three sections are based on interaction with 
a hypervisor. 
 
 
Figure 2 Hypervisor Detection Methods Classification 
Способы обнаружения МВМHypervisor detection methods
Time-based
Behavior-based
Based on the 
trusted hypervisor
By Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB)
By Return Stack Buffer (RSB)
By Unconditionally Intercepted Instructions
By Memory Access
By Errors in Hypervisors
By Errors in CPU
Signature-based
By Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB)
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2.1. Signature-Based Detection  
After a hypervisor has been loaded into memory its 
dispatcher (VMM handler) and Virtual Machine 
Control Structure (VMCS in Intel case) will be 
located in memory. The hypervisor can be detected 
by signature analysis of the physical memory 
(Bulygin & Samyde, 2008; Desnos, Filiol, & 
Lefou, 2011; Medley, 2007). 
This approach consists of two stages: memory 
dump and its inspection, both of which are not 
resilient to the hypervisor’s countermeasures. 
Analysis shows that software based memory dump 
approaches are vulnerable whereas the hardware 
ones are only applicable under laboratory 
conditions (Korkin & Nesterov, 2014). 
Let us analyze how resistant the current 
hypervisor’s signatures are. 
Thus Fritsch (2008) proposed to detect “Blue Pill” 
hypervisor by searching “BLPB”, “BLUE” and 
“BLUP” strings in a memory dump. However, in 
common cases such strings will be unknown to 
analysts. 
The Actaeon system (Graziano, Lanzi, & 
Balzarotti, 2013) is based on searching for VMCS 
fragments. However, this method can sometimes 
fail. For example, hypervisor can allocate in 
memory 100 structures to hamper detection. These 
VMCSes are similar to original VMCS. After that 
the Actaeon system may reveal many false 
VMCSes so separation between the original one 
and the rest will require a considerable amount of 
manual work. 
As a result, signature-based detection is ineffective 
for resistant hypervisors. 
2.2. Behavior-Based Detection 
Behavior-based detection relies on the system 
activity differences in the two cases, with and 
without a hypervisor. There are three 
behavior-based detection methods: TLB-based 
detection and methods based on errors in 
hypervisors and errors in CPUs. 
2.2.1. TLB-Based Detection. It is possible to apply 
the Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) which is a 
memory cache used to speed address translation to 
detect a hypervisor (Desnos et al., 2011; Fritsch, 
2008; Morabito, 2012; Wailly, 2014). 
TLB includes a set of recently accessed virtual and 
corresponding physical addresses. Every time OS 
accesses memory a corresponding TLB entry is 
searched for. If the requested virtual address is 
present in the TLB, the retrieved physical address 
will be used to access memory. In the other case the 
longtime search with the help of Page Directory 
will occur. This peculiarity will be discussed later 
in Section 2.4.1. 
It is known that VM-exit leads to flushing of TLB 
when a hypervisor is present. Otherwise without a 
hypervisor such clearance does not occur. This is 
why hypervisor detection reduces to checking TLB 
content, which can be made in several ways, for 
example by modifying page table entry (Myers & 
Youndt, 2007). 
However, TLB-based detection does not work on 
AMD CPUs and new Intel CPUs. The new 
supplementary TLB fields “ASID” and “PCID” do 
not let VM-exit flush TLB. 
2.2.2. Detection Based on Bugs in CPU. A 
hypervisor can be detected with the help of bugs in 
certain CPU models. In these CPUs the results of 
some instructions depend on whether or not a 
hypervisor is present. 
The “Erratum 140” in AMD CPU is based on using 
results of “RDMSR 10h”. The original value of the 
Time Stamp Counter (TSC) is returned by 
“RDMSR 10h” while “RDTSC” gets the sum of 
TSC value and VMCS.TSC_OFFSET value (AMD, 
2011). 
Another bug “VMSAVE 0x67” freezes the system. 
The execution of the VMSAVE instruction with 
0x67 prefix stops virtualization system. Without a 
hypervisor this error does not occur (Barbosa, 
2007). 
These detection methods are applicable only for 
outdated CPUs and require non trivial adaptation to 
new CPUs. 
2.2.3. Detection Based on Bugs in Hypervisors. 
There are software hypervisor bugs similar to 
hardware bugs in CPU. 
Microsoft published their paper “Hypervisor 
Top-Level Functional Specification”, which 
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describes how to detect a hypervisor and get 
“Hypervisor Vendor ID Signature”, by using 
CPUID (O'Neill, 2010; Microsoft, 2013). Spoofing 
attack is likely to occur, when a hypervisor can 
replace data, trapped by CPUID execution. 
“Blue Pill” hypervisor has a built-in control 
interface, which uses “Bpknock” hypercalls 
(BluePillStudy, 2010; Fritsch, 2008). Calling 
CPUID with EAX=0xbabecafe changes EAX to 
0x69696969, if “Blue Pill” is present. Otherwise 
such a change does not occur. Due to the 
hypervisor’s built-in control interface it is possible 
not only to detect, but also unload a hypervisor 
(Gabris, 2009).  
A hypervisor can also be detected by reading 
debugging messages. For example, a developer or 
hacker might have forgotten to remove DbgPrint 
calls, which can disclose a hypervisor’s activity. 
These approaches can reveal only well-known 
hypervisors, which do not take countermeasures. 
2.3. Detection Based on the Trusted Hypervisor 
A hypervisor which is loaded first can control and 
block activity of hypervisors which are loaded later. 
This detection method was used in “McAfee 
DeepSAFE” (McAfee, 2012), “Hypersight Rootkit 
Detector” (North Security Labs, 2011), “Symantec 
Endpoint Protection” (Korkin, 2012), and it has 
also been mentioned in papers (Park, 2013; Wang 
& Jiang, 2010). 
This detection approach is vulnerable to 
“Man-In-The-Middle” (MITM) attack, in which an 
illegitimate hypervisor can gain control first and 
compromise a legitimate one, which was loaded 
later on. TPM-based attestation of hypervisor can 
avoid this attack, although TMP mechanism is 
vulnerable too (Berger et al., 2006; Brossard & 
Demetrescu, 2012; Wojtczuk, & Rutkowska, 2009; 
Wojtczuk, Rutkowska, & Tereshkin, 2009). 
MITM attack can be also prevented by loading 
hypervisor from BIOS as well as by applying 
Trusted Startup Hardware Module (Accord, 2010). 
However, due to the difficulty of porting this 
detection method, it is applicable only to labs. 
2.4. Time-Based Detection 
Time-based detection uses the measuring of time 
duration of specific operations or profiling of its 
execution time. When a hypervisor is present the 
execution of such operations is intercepted by the 
hypervisor. As a result, their duration will be longer 
than without a hypervisor. 
Four time-based methods can be mentioned:  
TLB- and RSB-based detection, detection based on 
memory access and detection by unconditionally 
intercepted instructions. Let us focus on these 
methods applicable in the situation where a 
hypervisor prevents its detection by time cheating 
and temporary self-uninstalling. 
2.4.1. TLB-Based Detection. As it was mentioned 
before in Section 2.2.1, the TLB flushes every time 
VM-exit occurs. After that, the longtime fill will 
happen. It is possible to use this fact to detect 
hypervisor as follows (Ramos, 2009; Rutkowska, 
2007): 
1. Read the content of a specific memory 
address. 
2. Repeat step 1 and measure its duration. In 
this case the TLB entry, which was added 
on step 1, will be used. 
3. Execute unconditionally intercepted 
instruction (forcing a VM-exit). 
4. Repeatedly carry out step 2. 
5. Make a conclusion about the hypervisor 
presence by comparing the results of steps 
2 and 4.  
This approach does not work if the hypervisor uses 
time cheating, because there is no significant 
difference between these two steps. This approach 
has the same disadvantages as in Section 2.2.1. 
2.4.2. RSB-Based Detection. Another detection 
method is based on Return Stack Buffer (RSB), 
which increases computer performance. RSB 
content as well as TLB suffers changes when 
VM-exit occurs, but unlike TLB, RSB includes 
addresses of RET instructions. 
Applying RSB to hypervisor detection was 
described by Bulygin (2008) and later by Fritsch 
(2008) and Athreya (2010). After 16 nested 
functions calls, RSB will consist of 16 
corresponding return addresses. The idea of the 
detection lies in an attempt to fill the RSB buffer, 
call VM-exit, for example by calling an 
unconditionally intercepted instruction, measure an 
execution time of these 16 functions. If a 
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hypervisor is present, it intercepts VM-exit and 
replaces a part of RSB entries. As a result the 
whole duration will be longer than without a 
hypervisor. 
This method is vulnerable to the hypervisor’s 
countermeasures, for example if a hypervisor 
dispatcher has no sub-functions it is also vulnerable 
to time cheating attack (Athreya, 2010). 
2.4.3. Detection Based on Memory Access. A 
hypervisor can prevent its signature detection by 
controlling memory access (section 2.1.), which 
increases the duration of memory access and can be 
applied to hypervisor detection (Fisher-Ogden, 
2006; Fritsch, 2008). 
By walking successively through memory we 
measure each time the duration of memory page 
access. The memory region with excessive access 
duration is the stealth memory region. This region 
can consist of hypervisor dispatcher and 
corresponding structures. 
However, this method works only if the hypervisor 
does not use time cheating for self-protection. 
2.4.4. Detection by Unconditionally Intercepted 
Instructions. It is known that the duration of 
execution of unconditionally intercepted 
instructions increases after any hypervisor has been 
loaded in the system. We can detect hypervisor 
presence by comparing time duration with some 
threshold values (Athreya, 2010; 
Lakshminarayanan, Patel, Robinson, & Soulami, 
2012). 
Hardware virtualization for Intel CPU includes a 
set of unconditionally intercepted instructions, e. g. 
CPUID (Intel, 2014), for AMD CPU case we can 
use RDMSR (Morabito, 2012), which has to be 
triggered by a hypervisor. The authors also suggest 
measuring a HDD access time, RAM access time or 
duration of cryptographic computation (Kyte, 
Zavarsky, Lindskog, & Ruhl, 2012; Pek, & 
Buttyan, 2014). But such events can only be 
revealed by specialized hypervisors and does not 
work in ordinary cases. 
This detection approach is vulnerable to 
“Blue Chicken” technique and time cheating 
(Rutkowska, & Tereshkin, 2008). Nevertheless, this 
approach appears to be the most attractive because 
of its usability and portability. This approach is also 
universal, as a hypervisor will always spend time 
on VM-exits (VM-entries), and this time needs to 
be hidden. Because of these advantages this 
approach was chosen and was significantly 
improved. 
2.5. Analysis of Counters to Measure Instruction 
Execution Time 
Instruction execution time (IET) or its duration is 
the main scope of this research, so let us classify 
and analyze the capabilities of the computer 
counters, which can be applied to measure, e.g. the 
execution time of ten CPUID instructions. 
Counters can be classified as software and 
hardware ones. Hardware counters use device 
capabilities and may be further classified as local 
and remote ones. 
The software counter (or SMP counter) is based on 
simultaneous work of two loops (Desnos et al., 
2011; Jian, Huaimin, Shize, & Bo, 2010; Morabito, 
2012), which are running on different CPU cores. 
The first thread increments the control variable, 
while the second one executes the unconditionally 
intercepted instruction in the loop, for example 
1000 times. The conclusion about hypervisor 
presence is made by comparing the results of a 
control variable with the threshold value. One paper 
(Li, Zhu, Zhou, & Wang, 2011) describes how to 
prevent this approach by applying memory 
modification, which contains the control variable. 
To measure IET we can use the following hardware 
counters TSC, RTC, ACPI Timer, APIC Timer, 
HPET, PIT, local device counters, e.g. GPU timer, 
and NTP-based clock. Our analysis shows that all 
these counters apart from TSC and SMP have 
low-resolution and cannot be used in ordinary 
cases. SMP counting requires no less than two CPU 
cores and can be cheated. The best choice to 
measure the IET is TSC because of its accuracy and 
high-resolution. TSC also works on all CPUs. To 
eliminate the influence of other running programs 
on IET, we can use TSC on the highest IRQL and 
set the affinity of the measuring code with one of 
the CPU cores. 
The important advantage of TSC is the possibility 
to cheat on it easily, so we can simulate a stealthy 
hypervisor and test our detection approach in a real 
case. 
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2.6. Conclusion 
The above analysis shows that the existing 
approaches and hypervisor detection tools have the 
following drawbacks:  
1. Signature-based approaches are vulnerable to 
hypervisor countermeasures. Only Actaeon 
project can detect nested hypervisors, but it can 
also be compromised. 
2. Behavior-based detection methods do not 
reveal new hypervisors and do not work on 
new CPUs. 
3. Trusted hypervisor-based approach is 
susceptible to MITM attack. 
4. Time-based detection approaches are 
vulnerable to time cheating and Blue Chicken 
technique.  
Detection by unconditionally intercepted 
instructions is highly attractive, because it relies on 
a generally applicable technique. By improving 
data acquisition and processing, we can overcome 
the drawbacks of this method. 
3. THEORETICAL PRINCIPLES FOR 
ENHANCEMENT OF TIME-BASED 
DETECTION 
Detection by unconditionally intercepted 
instructions works well only if a hypervisor does 
not apply countermeasures: time cheating and 
temporary self-uninstalling. In this section the 
enhancement of this method is described. 
Our prerequisites are based on specific features of 
IET. One of them is the relation between the 
average IET and presence of a hypervisor. Another 
well-known one is a random nature of IET, but it is 
still unclear how to use it in practice. 
To grapple with this gap, let us look at the 
switching schemes between different CPU 
operating modes, which occur after OS is loaded. 
We demonstrate and analyze what actually happens 
when a set of CPUID instructions are being 
executed in three cases: when the hypervisor is 
present, not present and when several nested ones 
are present. 
Further we will focus on two IET characteristics: 
variance of IET array and IET array layering. 
According to some papers (Duflot, Etiemble, & 
Grumelard, 2006; Embleton, Sparks, & Zou, 2008; 
Zmudzinski, 2009) without a hypervisor a CPU can 
operate in one of the two modes: either in the 
Protected Mode (P-mode) or System Management 
Mode (S-mode), which is depicted on Figure 3, a. 
System Management Interrupt (SMI) switches from 
the P- to S-mode, CPU leaves S-mode and returns 
to the previous mode by using RSM instruction. 
We can conclude that CPU is a stochastic system 
with random transitions between states, because of 
a random nature of SMI. Therefore IET is a random 
value determined by the number of SMI.  
After the hypervisor is loaded the CPU can switch 
between the three modes. As in the previous case 
the P- and S- modes are present but an additional 
VMX root mode (V-mode) is added, so the P-mode 
is named as VMX non root mode (Intel, 2014). The 
P-mode is accepted as the main one, S-mode is 
duplicated for better clarity, see Figure 3, b. 
Execution of each CPUID instruction in P-mode 
always leads to switching to the V-mode 
(VM-exit), and after execution it switches back to 
the P-mode. Switching to the S-mode might occur 
either from P-mode or from V-mode. 
Similarly to the previous case we may assume that 
CPU works as a stochastic system, but switching to 
the V-mode enhances its random nature. As a result 
switching increases the average value of IET as 
well as the variability of IET.  
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a b 
Figure 3 Switching between Modes in Two Cases: (a) without a Hypervisor, (b) with One Hypervisor 
 
CPU works in a similar way in cases when several 
hypervisors are present (Ben-Yehuda et al., 2010). 
CPU can also switch between three modes, but the 
situation will be different because of several 
hypervisors dispatchers, see Figure 4. 
In this case execution of each CPUID instructions 
in P-mode always leads to switching to the 
V-mode, and further, each hypervisor’s dispatcher 
is successively called beginning from dispatcher #1 
to dispatcher #2 etc. to dispatcher #e and 
backwards. Finally execution will switch to 
P-mode. S-mode can gain control at any point. 
Now, CPU also works as a stochastic system, but 
participation of several nested dispatchers 
significantly lengthens the time of execution and 
increases IET variability. These schemes allow us 
to discover that the root of randomness of IET is 
actually the randomness of SMI. 
Suppose that probability or frequency of SMI is  
a constant. After a hypervisor is loaded, due to the 
increased IET the number of SMI is increased as 
well. That is why the variance of IET will increase 
after a hypervisor is loaded and this fact can be 
used for detection. During the execution of a set of 
CPUID the number of SMI is limited. If we repeat 
measuring of IET in a loop we can see that some of 
its values are repeated. Hence array of IET values 
can be grouped by sets with the same values (for 
details see Chapter 4). As a result, we can see that 
the array of IET values has a layered nature in all 
described cases. The number of layers will increase 
after a hypervisor is loaded and this fact can also be 
used for hypervisor detection. 
The revealed IET variability indexes, variance  
(or second moment) and number of layers  
(or spectral width) are resilient to time cheating. 
Hypervisor can only decrease the mean value of 
IET but not the variability characteristics. 
As a first approximation this analysis reveals two 
theoretical hypervisor indicators. This result is 
based on a hypothesis but now has to be 
comprehensively verified by experiments.  
 
 
Figure 4 Switching between Modes with Several Nested Hypervisors 
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Management Mode
(Se-mode)
SMI RSM
Hypervisor’s 
dispatcher #e
VM exit
VM entry
. .
. .
VM exit
VM entry
VMX root mode (V-mode)
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4. INSTRUCTION EXECUTION TIME 
RESEARCH & NEW STEALTH 
HYPERVISORS DETECTION ALGORITHMS 
Probabilistic hypervisor detection is discussed in 
following papers (Desnos et al., 2011; Fritsch, 
2008; Jian et al., 2010; Morabito, 2012). All these 
methods work only if a hypervisor is not hiding 
itself. What is more, these papers do not give 
enough attention to the random nature of IET. 
Detection of stealthy hypervisors faces two 
challenges: time cheating and data fluctuations, 
which will be described in this paper. 
4.1. Probabilistic Nature of Instruction 
Execution Time 
Desnos, Filiol and Lefou (2011) suggested that the 
instruction execution time is normally distributed 
and there are no problems with precision 
(repeatability and reproducibility) of the 
measurement data. 
However, all our experiments on different PCs 
showed that the measurement data are non-
normally distributed. There are no well-known 
distribution patterns which these data would match. 
Moreover, data fluctuation is so large that mean and 
variance statistics differ significantly between sets 
of experiments. Therefore the precision of the 
measurement data does not comply with ISO 5725 
(2004) requirements.  
We have to take into consideration that outliers and 
jumps (discontinuity) are very common, which will 
alter statistical values, see Figure 5. A possible 
reason for outliers and jumps is the pipeline of 
instructions. Due to the fact that the time 
measurement procedure is quite simple and a PoC 
hypervisor with time cheating can be used, we can 
receive an abundance of experimental data for 
research and detection phase, which significantly 
helps. Relying on the probabilistic nature of IET we 
dealt with when setting up experiments, these 
revealed data peculiarities, processing of 
preliminary data, only appeared after that we 
applied statistical methods. 
4.2. Experiments on Measurements of 
Instruction Execution Time 
To detect a hypervisor we improve the detection 
method, which uses unconditionally intercepted 
instructions. We analyze IET sets in the two cases 
with a hypervisor and without any. 
Experimental data was received by measuring a set 
of ten CPUID instructions by using RDTSC in  
a loop in Windows driver, see Figure 6. To dismiss 
the influence of other apps and drivers in the OS we 
ensured thread affinity with certain CPU core and 
raise IRQL to its maximum level. It is also possible 
to use deferred procedure call (DPC) to achieve an 
exclusive access to the hardware. An example of 
this scheme is described by Blunden (2012). 
 
Figure 5 Scatter Plot of IET Array Fragment with One Outlier and Jump 
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We use CPUID instruction as an unconditionally 
intercepted one by any Intel-based hypervisor and 
also as a serializing instruction which prevents 
out-of-order execution (Intel, 1998; Fog, 2014). 
Our proof-of-concept hypervisor (PoC hypervisor) 
is based on the VMM framework by Embleton 
(2007) with an added TSC cheating function. There 
are three different ways to cheat TSC: by 
TSC_OFFSET field in VMCS, catching execution 
of RDTSC or CPUID. We chose the last one: our 
hypervisor decreases the TSC's value every time 
CPUID is executed. This hypervisor's dispatcher is 
the smallest. By cheating TSC we can make sure 
that the average values of IET are the same to 
within one clock tick, whether the hypervisor is 
present or not. Therefore, this is the most complex 
case for detection. 
To obtain data we used two nested loops. An 
example of an inner loop is shown on Figure 6, it 
was executed 1000 times without any delays. Outer 
loop was executed 10 times with a two-second 
delay between each iteration. The results of this 
experiment were recorded to a 1000x10 array 
(see Table 1); the columns contain data from inner 
loops.  
According to ISO 5725 repeatability requirements 
we repeated the complete experiment five times 
with a two-second delay between each iteration. To 
control reproducibility of data we checked the 
results on 10 different days. All in all for this 
period we measured 50 arrays of 1000x10, which 
will be further processed. That period was 
sufficient to reduce variation intervals of statistics: 
average values, variance etc. 
Six PCs were involved in testing, see Table 2. In 
the first five PCs we used our PoC hypervisor, and 
in the last PC we used a specialized hypervisor 
loaded by BIOS – TRace EXplorer (TREX) by 
Tichonov and Avetisyan (2011). 
 
 
Figure 6 Code Fragment for Obtaining Data 
 
Table 1 Example of Array of Measured IET without a Hypervisor 
Measurement no 
Inner loop iteration 
1 2 … 10 
1 2896 2888 … 2896 
2 2896 2888 … 2880 
… … … … … 
1000 2888 2888 … 2888 
Average of a column 2895 2888 … 2888 
Variance of a column 1738 1267 … 1196 
 
KeSetSystemAffinityThread(affinity)
KfRaiseIrql(HIGH_LEVEL)
for (...)
{
RDTSC
MOV hst, EDX
MOV lst, EAX
CPUID // 1
...
CPUID // 10
RDTSC
MOV hfin, EDX
MOV lfin, EAX
save_time(hst, lst, hfin, lfin)
}
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Table 2 CPU Models and OS Versions 
PC# CPU models and OS versions 
1 Intel Core 2 Duo E6300 / Windows 7 
2 Intel Core 2 Duo E8200 / Windows 7 
3 Intel Core 2 Duo E8600 / Windows Live CD XP 
4 Intel Core i7 950 / Windows XP 
5 Intel Xeon X5600 / Windows 7 
6 AMD Phenom X4 945 / Windows Live CD XP 
 
4.3. Peculiarities of Instruction Execution Time 
and Ways of Hypervisors Detection  
Our experiments confirmed the following:  
1. IET measured by TSC is a random value, 
which depends on a CPU model, OS version 
and on whether or not a hypervisor is present. 
2. The average and variance of IET arrays are 
larger if a hypervisor is present than if it is not. 
3. The difference between average and variance 
of IET arrays becomes more significant after 
every new nested hypervisor has been loaded. 
We can easily and reliably detect a non-hidden 
hypervisor by just comparing the average values of 
IET arrays. The average values of IET arrays with a 
non-hidden hypervisor are almost 10 times larger 
than without it.  
But a hypervisor can apply time cheating technique 
and as a result the average values of IET will be the 
same as corresponding values without a hypervisor. 
There are no time-based detection methods which 
work well under such circumstances. Our 
experiments were focused on this challenging case. 
Using more common statistical methods in 
hypervisor detection proved to be inapplicable. The 
reasons will be given below. 
By using statistics we can determine if there is a 
statistically significant difference between two sets 
of data. We already know which of the set will be 
measured with exposure and without it. 
But in the current situation we have several sets. 
We can connect several sets to a big one, and use 
classical approaches, but such operation has to be 
proved. For this case there are no proven statistical 
methods. 
Applying current approaches to determine 
significant difference between the sets did not yield 
any positive results for a variety of reasons. We can 
consider the columns of arrays as a random sample, 
also as a result of the random process. It is 
impossible to use the first method, because of the 
fluctuation of measurements and lack of 
homogeneity. The second method is not applicable 
either, because of overlapping variation intervals 
and instability of characteristics. 
We see that homogeneity of variances (HOV) is 
violated in all our experimental data, and as a result 
we cannot use analysis of variance (ANOVA) in 
data processing.  
We conclude that methods of parametric and non-
parametric statistics are not applicable in the 
current situation. That is why we developed the 
following methods, including the present author’s 
approaches: 
1. Low-frequency filtration. 
2. Calculation of experimental probability. 
3. Two-step way to calculate statistics. 
4. Variation interval as confidence interval. 
5. Iteration of measurements if the statistical 
value is at the intersection of two variation 
intervals. 
Due to filtration we can decrease fluctuation and 
stabilize variation characteristics. 
Due to calculation of experimental probability we 
can find threshold values and so minimize 
type I and II errors. 
We choose a two-step way of calculating in order 
to reduce overlapping of these characteristic 
intervals. 
To calculate a confidence interval we choose the 
idea of the confidence interval method of Strelen 
(2004) and Kornfeld (1965), in which a confidence 
interval is calculated as a variation interval or 
difference between maximum (𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥) and minimum 
(𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛) values of statistic. The confidence level is 
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the following 𝑃{𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≪ 𝜃 < 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥} = 1 − 0.5
𝑛−1, 
where ‘𝑛’ is the length of a sample. 
We have to study a situation when a calculated 
statistical value will be at the intersection of two 
variation intervals. In this situation it is impossible 
to decide whether a hypervisor is present or not. In 
this case we have to repeat measurements of IET 
arrays and calculations of statistics. In accordance 
with the multiplication theorem of probability a 
recurrent hit in the intersection zone is unlikely.  
4.3.1. Applying Layered Structure of IET 
Arrays to Hypervisors Detection. Numerous 
experiments show that IET arrays have a layered 
structure. It means that each IET array is comprised 
of several layers, whose characteristics depend on 
CPU, OS and whether or not a hypervisor is 
present.  
First of all our experiments confirm, that the 
number of layers with a hypervisor is larger than 
without a hypervisor.  
To make it clear, the results of an experiment are 
given below. We measured IET arrays in two cases: 
without hypervisor and with it.  
The right part of Figure 7 is a scatter plot of the IET 
array; each point corresponding to the measured 
duration of ten CPUID instructions. Experiment 
numbers are on the x-axis, while IET values are 
displayed on the y-axis.  
Blue color corresponds to IET without a 
hypervisor, red color corresponds to IET with a 
hypervisor, which is applying time cheating. This 
technique leads to getting approximately the same 
mean value if hypervisor is present with the mean 
value without a hypervisor. 
The left part of Figure 7 shows the corresponding 
frequency polygons or relative frequency chart. We 
can see that with a hypervisor the number of 
polygon points (or number of layers) is larger than 
without a hypervisor.  
The similar nature of polygons was also noted by 
Morabito (2012). His observations show that the 
data is generally not normally distributed and 
skewed, long-tailed data with outliers is fairly 
common. Similar plots of IET array fragments are 
given in the paper by Fritsch (2008) in the part 
“A.4 Empirical results” and by Li, Zhu, Zhou, & 
Wang (2011). However, the fact that layered 
structure could be used for hypervisor detection had 
not been mentioned. 
If several hypervisors are present, the layering 
structure of IET arrays is still obvious. We 
measured IET arrays in four different cases: 
without hypervisor (black), with only own PoC 
hypervisor (green), with only Acronis hypervisor 
(blue) and with two nested hypervisors (red). The 
scatter plots of the corresponding IET arrays are 
shown on Figure 8.  
To make it clear, the scatter plots are spaced 
vertically. We can see that without a hypervisor the 
plot consists of only one line with quite rare jumps. 
If PoC hypervisor is present, the corresponding plot 
has 2-3 layers with significant jumps. The situation 
is similar if only Acronis hypervisor is present. If 
two nested hypervisors are present we can see that 
the plot becomes a cloud of points, there are a lot of 
layers with low frequency.  
The best way to reveal the number of layers is to 
use the frequency distribution of measured IET 
arrays. We calculate frequency distribution with 
each class for one value or without intervals of 
numbers. Number of layers equals the number of 
classes. 
It is possible to detect a stealth hypervisor, which 
uses the Blue Chicken technique. Temporary 
self-uninstalling of this hypervisor originally occurs 
after 50-100 measurements of IET because 
hypervisor needs to recognize time-based detection. 
As a result we will see the changed nature of the 
scatter plot: the first 50-100 measurements will 
have a layered nature and the remaining portion of 
measurements will have just 1-2 layers because the 
hypervisor has already been uninstalled. This 
changing of the scatter plot will be repeated in the 
next columns; because they were measured with a 
two-second delay. 
However, our experiments show that direct use of 
these indicators is problematic for two reasons. 
These characteristics are not always constant (they 
are unstable) and also variation ranges of these 
characteristics overlap each other whether 
hypervisor is present or not. Later we will discuss 
how to deal with it. 
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Figure 7 Scatter Plots of IET Arrays Fragments and Corresponding Frequency Polygons 
 
 
Figure 8 Scatter Plots of IET Arrays Fragments in Four Different Cases 
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4.3.2. Applying Second and Fourth Moments to 
Hypervisors Detection. All our experiments also 
confirmed the following result of section 3. After 
hypervisor is loaded the numerical values that 
measure the spread of IET arrays will increase. We 
obtained good results with the second and fourth 
moments. Moreover, after loading each nested 
hypervisor these sample characteristics increase, 
which is clearly seen in Figure 8. Experiments 
show that the sixth and higher moments of IET 
arrays are seriously inaccurate. 
As mentioned before, outliers and jumps 
(discontinuity) significantly affected values of the 
second and fourth moments. That is why it is 
impossible to achieve a stable distinction between 
sample characteristics and draw a conclusion as to 
whether a hypervisor is present or not. Negative 
impacts of these factors can be eliminated by 
simultaneously applying two techniques: fitting or 
low-frequency filtering and “length-averaging”. 
We get sample characteristics before and after an 
outlier and calculate the final value by averaging of 
the corresponding fragments lengths for 
“length-averaging”. 
In order to reduce overlapping of these 
characteristics intervals we chose a two-step way of 
calculating. We calculate the second and fourth 
moments for each column in the table (IET array), 
see Table 1. This brings us to a set of these 
characteristics, which we consider as a new sample 
and repeatedly calculate characteristics of this set. 
In other words, from the primary column of IET 
array we get the secondary characteristics, which 
we are processes by statistical methods. 
Consequently this helps us to significantly reduce 
or avoid the overlapping of new characteristics 
intervals. 
All theoretical principles from Section 3 were 
successfully confirmed by experiment. The number 
of layers of IET arrays, second and fourth moments 
increased and remained on the same increased level 
after a new hypervisor was loaded, i.e. they can be 
used to detect a hypervisor and several nested ones. 
Moreover the ways of calculating threshold values 
of each statistic will be given with due 
consideration of data fluctuations. 
4.4. How to Calculate Threshold Values of 
Statistics to Detect Hypervisors 
Hypervisor detection includes comparison of 
calculated statistics values with threshold values. If 
statistical values are greater than threshold values, 
we conclude that a hypervisor is present, otherwise 
there is no hypervisor. The main goal is to find a 
suitable filtration level and the statistic, which has 
an appropriate threshold value or minimal sum of 
type I and type II errors. 
To calculate threshold values we have to measure 
50 arrays 1000x10 for two cases when a hypervisor 
is present or not, 100 arrays in total. We use own 
PoC hypervisor, because it contains the minimal set 
of instructions in CPUID dispatcher and its only 
role is TSC cheating. This is the most difficult case. 
PoC hypervisor’s threshold values will help to 
detect any other hypervisor with more functions, as 
it will cause more changes to IET variation.  
Calculating threshold values includes calculating 
statistics in two ways after low frequency filtering 
with the following levels {0, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 
0.2} or {0%, 2%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%}. 
One way is to calculate statistics for each column 
1000x1 of a 1000x10 array. After this calculation 
we analyzed the received set of 10 values as a new 
sample and then averaged them (𝑙 ̅ – “averaged 
columns value”). 
Another way is to calculate statistics for one big 
column 10,000x1 obtained from an array 1000x10 
by vectorizing (Vectorization (mathematics), 2014) 
(𝑙𝑣 – “vectorized array value”). 
It should not be forgotten that outliers and jumps 
(discontinuity) significantly change statistics values 
and therefore we have to delete them. We find a 
jump as the maximum value in the first order 
difference (The Scipy Community, 2009). The 
threshold value of a jump is 300 CPU ticks, which 
can then be corrected.  
The calculation algorithm of threshold values is the 
same for all statistics and includes three steps: 
1. Receive and process IET array every day. 
Receive preliminary results. 
2. Process the preliminary results which are 
obtained for 10 days. Receive threshold values 
and probabilities of type I and II error. 
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3. Create the final table with all appropriate 
statistics. 
We are going to describe a way to calculate 
threshold values of a new statistic – a number of 
layers. 
The first step is to filter each column from Table 1 
with different filtration levels. For each received 
column we calculate the number of layers. 
Calculated values are given in corresponding 
columns in Table 3. 
The last but one column in Table 3 includes the 
mean values of the number of layers for each 
filtration level. For example the first value 12 is 
(28+29+...+10)/10. The last column includes the 
values of the number of layers, which were 
calculated from the column 10,000x1 for each 
filtration level. E.g. the first value 53 means the 
number of layers in the array 10,000x1 after its 
filtration with level 0%.
 
Table 3 Example of Calculating the Number of Layers If no Hypervisor is Present 
Filtering 
level 
Values of the number of layers 
for each column in array 
1000x10 
Averaged 
columns value, 
𝑙 ̅
Vectorized 
array value, 𝑙𝑣 
1 2 … 10 
0 28 29 … 10 12 53 
0.02 4 3 … 3 4 6 
0.05 3 3 … 3 3 6 
0.1 2 2 … 3 3 3 
0.15 1 2 … 2 2 3 
0.2 1 2 … 2 2 2 
 
Table 4 Number of Layers of IET Arrays for 2 Cases when a Hypervisor is Present and not 
Code of 
experiments 
No hypervisor Hypervisor is present 
Averaged 
columns value, 𝑙 ̅
Vectorized 
array value, 𝑙𝑣 
Averaged 
columns value, 𝑙 ̅
Vectorized 
array value, 𝑙𝑣 
day #1 (Ig10) 
5 23 11 47 
4 18 11 52 
4 15 10 34 
5 21 13 53 
4 15 14 68 
 
 
... … … … 
day #10 (Ig19) 
4 20 19 102 
6 32 15 77 
6 32 16 79 
6 32 20 88 
10 50 21 105 
Variation intervals [4, 14] [10, 110] [8, 21] [29,105] 
Threshold values ≤ 7 ≤ 32 ≥ 8 ≥ 33 
Type I error 0.04 0.12 – – 
Type II error 0 0.16 – – 
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We can see that with filtration level “0.1” 
the values of 𝑙 ̅ and 𝑙𝑣 are stabilized, therefore we 
will use this filtration level for this PC in the future. 
The similar table is also created if PoC hypervisor 
is present. Four numbers, values 𝑙 ̅ and 𝑙𝑣 in two 
cases when a hypervisor is present or not present, 
are evaluated from a single 1000x10 array in each 
case. 
This procedure was repeated for each of five arrays 
1000x10 every day, for 10 days. 
After that we create a preliminary table with 
threshold values and type I and II errors, see 
Table 4. 
Stabilization of statistics is obvious in both cases 
when a hypervisor is present and not. We managed 
to achieve this stabilization only due to filtration of 
jumps and length-averaging, as previously 
mentioned. 
Variation intervals were determined according to 
minimum and maximum values of the statistics in 
the columns. Variation intervals overlap, therefore 
if statistical values get into this overlapping, it is 
impossible to reliably detect a hypervisor. In these 
cases we have to repeat IET array measurements. 
We chose threshold values so that the sum of 
probability of type I and II errors was minimal. 
Type I error means that we conclude that the 
hypervisor is there according to calculations, while 
actually it is not there. The probability of a 
type I error is experimentally calculated as a 
number of values, which are greater than the 
threshold value. A type II error means that we 
conclude that the hypervisor is not there, while 
actually it is there. The probability of this error is 
also experimentally calculated as a number of 
values, which is smaller than the threshold value. In 
other words, we calculate the probability of type I 
and II errors with this formula 𝑟 𝑔⁄  , where ‘𝑟’ is the 
number of values in the column, which are outside 
the threshold, 𝑔 = 50 is the total number of values 
in the column. For detection we used only those 
statistics, whose sum of type I and II errors are less 
than 0.2 (or 20%).  
Below is a fragment of the final table (Table 5) 
with all appropriate statistics for all tested PCs from 
Table 2.  
?̅? is the average value of IET from all arrays 
without a hypervisor and all other statistical 
notations are below in Table 6. As mentioned 
above we can calculate the statistics in two ways: 
for each column and after vectorization.  
Our research findings suggest that threshold values 
depend on Windows version. For the same 
hardware threshold values for Windows XP and 
Windows 7 are different, variation intervals of 
statistics on Windows XP are smaller than on 
Windows 7. This occurs because Windows 7 
enables more SMI handlers than Windows XP. 
We performed similar experimental checks for 
nested hypervisors. We used the following iteration 
algorithm: 
1. First, we obtained threshold values for the case 
without a hypervisor. To do this we measured 
IET arrays without a hypervisor and with our 
PoC hypervisor. We received that 𝐿 ≤ 31 
(number of layers) means there is no 
hypervisor. The probability of a false positive 
is 0.14. 𝐿 ≥ 32 means a hypervisor is present. 
The probability of false negative is 0.06. 
2. Secondly, we installed Acronis Disk Director, 
which loaded its own hypervisor. In the same 
way we obtained threshold values for this case. 
To do this we measured IET arrays with only 
the Acronis hypervisor and with two nested 
hypervisors: PoC and Acronis. We found out 
that 𝐿 ≤ 67 or more precisely 32 ≤ 𝐿 ≤ 67 
means that only the Acronis hypervisor is 
present. 𝐿 ≥ 86 means that two nested 
hypervisors simultaneously work. Probabilities 
of type I and II errors in the latter case is 0. 
Table 7 includes the threshold values for all 
mentioned cases. 
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Table 5 Final Table with all Appropriate Statistics  
PC Statistics 
Filtration 
level 
Threshold values Probability 
No 
hypervisor 
Hypervisor 
is present 
Type I 
error 
Type II 
error 
1 
?̅?  0 ≤ 2,911 – – – 
?̅? 0 ≤ 7 ≥ 8  0.04 0 
?̅?  0 ≤ 14 ≥ 18 0.02 0 
?̅?  0.1 ≤ 679 ≥ 947 0.02 0 
𝜇  0.1 ≤ 104,161 ≥ 111,041 0.02 0.10 
2 
?̅? 0 ≤ 2492 – – – 
?̅? 0 ≤ 11 ≥ 12 0.1 0.06 
?̅?  0.2 ≤ 100 ≥ 101 0.08 0.1 
?̅?  0.2 ≤ 168 ≥ 13,030 0.14 0.02 
3 
?̅?  0 ≤ 2,431 – – – 
?̅? 0 ≤ 6 ≥ 8 0 0 
?̅?  0.1 ≤ 15 ≥ 41 0 0 
𝜇  0.1 ≤ 609 ≥ 3,410 0 0 
4 
?̅?  0 ≤ 5,018 – – – 
?̅? 0 ≤ 22 ≥ 26 0.02 0.02 
?̅?  0.1 ≤ 177 ≥ 181 0.1 0.1 
5 
?̅?  0 ≤ 2,852 – – – 
?̅?  0 ≤ 67 ≥ 71 0.04 0 
?̅?  0 ≤ 16,416 ≥ 48,920 0 0 
6 
?̅?  0 ≤ 2,126 – – – 
?̅?  0 ≤ 34 ≥ 241 0 0 
𝑙 ̅ 0 ≤ 134 ≥ 593 0 0 
?̅?  0 ≤ 216 ≥ 5,478 0 0 
𝑑 0 ≤ 345 ≥ 5,422 0 0 
?̅?  0.02 ≤ 54 ≥ 956 0 0 
 
Table 6 Statistical Notations 
 Averaged columns value Vectorized array value 
Number of layers ?̅? 𝑙 
2nd central moment  ?̅? 𝑑 
4th central moment ?̅? 𝜇 
 
Table 7 Threshold Values for Two Nested Hypervisors 
Threshold 
values 
Conclusion about hypervisors and 
their numbers 
Type I error Type II error 
𝐿 ≤ 31 No hypervisor 0.14 0 
32 ≤ 𝐿 ≤ 67 Only Acronis hypervisor is present 0 0.06 
𝐿 ≥ 86 Two nested hypervisors are present 0 0 
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4.5. Detection of Stealthy Hypervisors  
According to experiments the detection of 
hypervisors goes in two stages: through preliminary 
and operational stages, seeTable 8. First of all we 
have to make sure that there is no hypervisor in 
BIOS. To achieve this we update/flash BIOS with a 
known and trusted image. Malware in BIOS can 
prevent its updating by software utility. That is why 
the best way to overwrite BIOS is to desolder a 
microchip from the motherboard, flash it by 
hardware programmer and solder it back 
(Muchychka, 2013). 
In the second step we install OS. We have to use 
official images to be certain that OS images do not 
include any malware or illegitimate hypervisors. 
Additionally OS components may be checked, e.g. 
by reverse-engineering.  
In the third step we get threshold values by using 
PoC hypervisor. This step was described above.  
In the fourth step we run the hypervisor presence 
check in an infinite loop. We measure IET arrays in 
a loop and compare calculated statistics with 
threshold values, which were calculated in step 3. 
We successively check if a hypervisor is present on 
each CPU physical core. 
On the fifth and sixth steps we install 
supplementary software and monitor messages 
about new hypervisors.  
If we get a message about new hypervisors after a 
program installation, we check if this hypervisor is 
legitimate. The approaches how to do this are 
beyond the scope of this paper. It may be noted that 
we can do it by calling corresponding support 
service etc. Once we conclude that the hypervisor is 
legitimate, we have to adapt the detection tool by 
obtaining new threshold values (step 3). If we 
conclude that the hypervisor is illegitimate, it must 
be removed from the system. In some cases this is 
solved by just uninstalling the previously installed 
program. However in more complicated cases we 
have to check all the system components including 
the BIOS image. 
All source codes of getting threshold values, PoC 
hypervisor and detection tool are here 
(Korkin, 2014). The tool for getting threshold 
values consists of two parts: subsystem for IET 
arrays acquisition (C++) and subsystem for 
threshold values calculation (MATLAB). PoC 
hypervisor was developed using С++ and ASM, 
and it is compiled with Visual Studio. The 
detection tool consists of two parts: subsystem for 
IET arrays acquisition and subsystem for threshold 
values checks by MATLAB. 
5. CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSIONS AND 
FUTURE WORK 
1. Hypervisor detection is a well-known 
challenge. Malware with hypervisor facilities 
are serious information security threats. Many 
authors and companies are trying to tackle this 
challenge. 
2. In this paper we focused on and improved time 
based detection by unconditionally intercepted 
instructions. We studied the case when a 
hypervisor uses time cheating and temporary 
self-uninstalling to prevent its detection. For 
this situation appropriate time based 
approaches are not available on the Internet. 
Only the described methods are able to detect 
stealthy hypervisors in all known 
countermeasures: time-cheating etc. 
 
 
Table 8 Detection of Stealthy Hypervisors 
Stages Stage description 
Preliminary 
1. Flash BIOS with a trusted image or firmware. 
2. Install OS. 
3. Get threshold values for no hypervisor case. 
Operational 
(detection) 
4. Check in a loop if a hypervisor is present. 
5. Install supplementary software (optional). 
6. Monitor messages about a hypervisor presence. 
7. To adapt the tool to new legitimate hypervisor go to 3. 
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3. We explored the probability characteristics of 
instruction execution time and proposed a new 
technique for the detection of a hypervisor and 
several nested ones. 
4. We developed techniques for calculating 
threshold values of various statistics and a 
step-by-step guide on how to detect a 
hypervisor. 
5. These methods work well on different PCs with 
both Intel and AMD CPUs and detected PoC 
hypervisor and special BIOS hypervisor.  
5.1. Hypervisor Detection without Flashing 
BIOS and Reinstalling OS 
The proposed hypervisor detection method (or its 
preliminary starting procedure) needs to stop 
system activity to flash BIOS, reinstall OS etc. But 
for some systems this interruption of work is 
prohibited or impossible. However, on the basic of 
our experimental results, we can guarantee no 
hypervisor presence without performing 1-2 steps 
and unwanted system shutdown. To achieve this we 
acquire IET arrays on PC, which is already in 
operation. If after IET arrays filtering step we get 
1-2 stable layers, this will mean that there is no 
hypervisor. This peculiarity occurs on PCs with 
Windows XP and should be investigated further. 
5.2. Applying Numerical Values of Layers for 
Hypervisor Detection  
We have discovered another pattern which can be 
used to detect a hypervisor. Thus most of our 
experiments numerical values of layers are unique. 
For example, in Figure 7 we see that numerical 
values of different layers after filtering indicate 
hypervisor presence. We achieve the following 
numerical values of layers without hypervisor 
{2160, 2168, 2184, 2192, 2200, 2478, 2480, 2880, 
2888, 2904, 2920, 2936} and these values {2876, 
2884, 2892, 2900, 2908, 2916, 2924} with PoC 
hypervisor. We see that these two sets do not 
contain equal values. Moreover, if a hypervisor 
cheats TSC so that the first members from each set 
are equal, the second and the next members from 
the above sets will differ. This happens because of 
the differences of deltas in each set {8, 24, 32, 40, 
318, 320, 720, 728, 744, 760, 776} and {8, 16, 24, 
32, 40, 48}. 
The reasons for this difference and its resilience to 
hypervisor countermeasures requires further 
research. 
5.3. Ways to Develop Computer Forensics and 
Statistics for Universities 
The proposed statistical methods and tools for 
hypervisor detection can be used in two different 
disciplines. Firstly, it may become a part of 
Computer Forensics Discipline, when students can 
acquire practical skills working with hardware 
virtualization technology. PoC hypervisor can be 
used as a basic platform for further improvements; 
for example to create an event tracing tool which 
will monitor low-level events and will be resilient 
to modern malware. Hypervisor detection tools can 
be used to invent new detection approaches, based 
for example on all unconditionally intercepted 
instructions (CPUID, INVD, MOV from/to CR3, 
all VMX instructions, RDMSR and WRMSR). 
These may have different parameters, including 
wrong or invalid parameters, as well as profiling 
execution time for different sets and sequences of 
instructions, not just ten CPUIDs as is described in 
this paper. Analysis of time of physical memory 
access can be applied to find time anomalies due to 
possible hidden objects. Such a detection approach 
may need checking all the memory pages, including 
valid and invalid addresses. We compare IET 
characteristics before and after disabling the CPU’s 
cache control mechanism. A stealth hypervisor has 
to cheat TSC with different deltas for each case, 
which does not always occur. 
Secondly it may become a part of a course in 
“Statistics and Data Analysis”. Because of its 
opportunity to acquire a lot of real experimental 
data sets students can acquire practical experience 
of data processing and its analysis. They can learn 
how to solve repeatability and reproducibility 
problems. They can apply different statistical 
criteria to test correlations between arrays for 
different cases: with a hypervisor and without it. As 
a result students will not only better understand the 
theoretical materials of the course, but will also 
acquire new practical skills and apply them in their 
own research. 
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5.4. Applying Hidden BIOS Hypervisor to Track 
Stolen Laptops 
It is well known that an organization has to pay 
heavily every time an employee’s laptop is lost or 
stolen. The idea is to create a software agent which 
will track a laptop, block it if it is stolen, control it 
remotely etc. This tool will work like Computrace 
LoJack by Absolute Software (2014). The key 
moment is to create a software agent, which will be 
really hard to detect, delete and block. By using 
hardware virtualization technology we can create a 
hypervisor, which works permanently. To 
guarantee that autorun works well, it will be loaded 
from BIOS. This hypervisor can hide memory areas 
and prevent its own rewriting by software tools 
with the help of Shadow Page Tables for AMD 
CPUs or Extended Page Tables for Intel CPUs. 
This hypervisor can be easily planted in any PC 
which supports hardware virtualization. To 
facilitate development of this hypervisor we can 
use open source software components, for example 
Coreboot (2014) for BIOS firmware, TianoCore 
(2014) for UEFI and XEN (The Xen Project, 2014) 
as a basis for this hypervisor. 
5.5. Applying Hypervisor as USB Firewall to 
prevent BadUSB attack 
Nohl and Lell (2014) presented an idea and 
prototype of malware USB stick. The idea lies in 
reprogramming a USB device in order to add new 
unauthorized functions. As a result, for example, a 
reprogrammed USB stick will work as a USB 
keyboard and by running malware commands can 
take over a computer. This vulnerability is really 
serious because this USB device works invisibly 
for user and AVs and formatting USB flash does 
not erase malware firmware.  
We can solve this challenge by using a hypervisor’s 
facilities, which will control all the devices access 
to the PC. By applying manual configuration mode 
the hypervisor can block malware activities of such 
devices. It will look as if a hypervisor is playing the 
role of a USB firewall. For example, after a USB 
device plugs into the computer port the hypervisor 
will display the list of all registered devices and 
allow the user to choose the appropriate position. 
After that the hypervisor will control the work of 
all USB devices according to the access policies of 
these devices. As a result this hypervisor working 
as USB firewall can guarantee protection of PCs 
from BadUSB attack or other malware USB 
devices.  
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